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Poor Relief, Informal Assistance, and Short Time during the Lancashire 
Cotton Famine1 
 
George Boyer 
Department of Labor Economics, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell 
University 
 
This paper presents new evidence concerning the importance of poor relief as a source of income assistance 
for unemployed operatives during the Lancashire cotton famine. My comparison of weekly data on the 
number of relief recipients in 23 distressed poor law unions with estimates of weekly cotton consumption 
for the period November 1861 to December 1862 suggests that the average length of time between 
becoming unemployed and receiving poor relief was less than 2 months. This result is shown to be 
consistent with available evidence on working class saving. Given the meager amount of informal 
assistance available to them, most operatives were forced to turn to the poor law for income assistance 
within 4 to 8 weeks of becoming unemployed. 
 
In a recent paper in this journal, Kiesling (1996) correctly argues that the relationship 
between cyclical unemployment and poor relief in Victorian Lancashire was not as 
straightforward as implied by my analysis of the economics of poor relief in industrial cities 
(Boyer, 1990, Chap. 8). I sought to explain how cost-minimizing employers responded to cyclical 
fluctuations in demand and did not examine the extent to which workers who had lost their jobs 
or had been put on short time used "informal assistance" or private charity to relieve their 
distress. In so doing, I did not mean to suggest that such alternatives did not exist. 
I agree with Kiesling that informal sources of assistance, such as individual saving, intrafamily 
transfers, and credit, played a significant role during downturns. We disagree, however, on the 
relative importance of poor relief and informal assistance. Kiesling (1996, pp. 67,81) maintains 
that unemployed textile workers "generally relied on informal sources of income assistance" and 
that "the poor law provided an insurance institution of final recourse," while I contend that, 
before the beginning of the Crusade against Outrelief in the late 1860s, poor relief was a major 
source of income assistance to unemployed workers and that informal sources were relatively less 
important for all but the highest-paid cotton operatives. 
 In this paper I reexamine the roles played by poor relief, informal assistance, private 
charity, and short time during the Lancashire cotton famine. Section I presents new evidence 
concerning the length of the lag between declines in cotton production and increases in the 
number of poor relief recipients. I construct weekly series for raw cotton consumption and for the 
number of relief recipients in 23 Lancashire/Cheshire poor law unions. A comparison of the 
trends of these series suggests that the lag between becoming unemployed and receiving poor 
relief was relatively short and therefore that the importance of the poor law as a source of income 
assistance was greater, and the role of informal assistance smaller, than Kiesling maintains. 
Section II examines the role of individual saving and other informal sources of assistance and 
offers a rough estimate of the length of time that, on average, an unemployed cotton operative and 
his family could subsist on informal assistance. Section III examines the administration of poor 
relief and private charity in Lancashire cities during the cotton famine and earlier downturns, 
while Section IV examines the role of short time. My conclusions are summarized in Section V. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 I thank Stanley Engerman, Andrew Rutten, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and Jesse Leary for able research 
assistance. 
 
 
Section I. 
 
Kiesling contends that cotton operatives were very reluctant to apply for poor relief, 
which led them when unemployed "to take advantage of all other means [of income assistance] to 
the extent possible, for as long as they lasted.... As workers and their families dissipated their 
savings and assets, they had little alternative but to apply for public relief or to request charitable 
assistance" (Kiesling, 1996, pp. 71-72). She offers an indirect test of the hypothesis that 
unemployed workers depleted their informal sources of income before requesting poor relief. The 
test consists of measuring the length of the lag between the beginning of the cotton famine and 
the sharp increase in the number of able-bodied and non-able-bodied persons receiving poor relief 
in six Lancashire poor law unions2.  The longer the lag, the more important the use of informal 
sources of income. Unfortunately, data on the number of able-bodied and non-able-bodied relief 
recipients are available for only 2 weeks a year (the first week in January and the first week in 
July). Kiesling (1996, pp. 78-79) concludes from the sharp increase in the number of relief 
recipients between July 1862 and January 1863 that the lag between the beginning of the famine 
and the widespread  application for poor relief was as long as 14 months (October 1861 to 
January 1863) and therefore that the poor law was "an institution of last resort." Finally, Kiesling 
contends that, since a large share of the non-able-bodied were "infirm relatives of able-bodied 
cotton workers," the fact that the numbers of both able-bodied and non-able-bodied relief 
recipients peaked in January 1863 indicates that "families would pool resources until they were 
exhausted, and then request public relief at the same time, if at all" (1996, p. 77). 
The view that cotton workers were strong believers in self-help and were averse to 
applying for poor relief even when unemployed is shared by many historians, although some 
argue that workers were much more averse to being relieved in workhouses than to receiving 
outdoor relief3. Despite their distaste for the poor law, most factory workers were forced to apply 
for relief within a short time of becoming unemployed. According to MacKinnon (1986), a 
worker's application for relief indicated that his assets were exhausted and that he was a poor 
credit risk. Pauperism was undesirable "as long as relatively few people received relief.... 
Therefore, there will be some lag between the onset of unemployment and recourse to the poor 
law. Given the low level of assets, this was likely to be fairly short, and there is no evidence that 
the gap changed with time" (MacKinnon, 1986, pp. 301-302). 
Boot (1990) estimated the length of this lag for Manchester factory workers during the downturn 
of 1847/1848, by comparing changes in unemployment and in numbers receiving poor relief. He 
concluded that "the average lag between becoming unemployed and receiving relief" was about 6 
weeks (1990, p. 225). Boot argued that informal assistance was "more acceptable" than poor 
relief for factory workers, and yet he was surprised that the lag was "as long as six weeks. . . 
given the low level of working-class savings in the 1840s" (1990, p. 225). It is difficult to 
reconcile Boot's findings with Kiesling's conclusion that the lag between the beginning of the 
cotton famine and the sharp increase in the number of able-bodied persons receiving poor relief 
was as long as 14 months4. Kiesling acknowledges Boot's result, but she offers no explanation 
why unemployed cotton operatives were able to subsist on informal assistance several months 
longer before applying for relief in 1862 than in 1847. 
 In fact, the lag between becoming unemployed and receiving relief cannot be measured at 
all precisely with the semiannual data on the number of able-bodied and non-able-bodied relief 
recipients used by Kiesling. However, weekly data on the total number of relief recipients are 
                                               
2 The poor law unions used by Kiesling are Ashton-under-Lyne, Bolton, Oldham, Preston, Rochdale, and Wigan. 
3 For example, Clapham (1932, p. 427) writes that in 1860 "wage-earners and their families, especially in the towns, had lost none of 
their horror of 'the house'; nor had there been any change in their willingness to accept outdoor relief in emergency." 
4 Part of the difference is caused by the fact that Boot estimated the length of the "lag between becoming unemployed and receiving 
relief," while Kiesling estimated the lag between "the large increase in short time work" and the peak in numbers receiving relief. 
 
 
available for the period of the cotton famine. If, as Kiesling maintains, the trends in the able-
bodied and non-able bodied series are similar, then the weekly series should be a reasonable 
proxy for the trend in the number of able-bodied relief recipients. 
 Figure 1 shows the number of persons receiving poor relief in 23 "distressed" unions and 
townships in Lancashire and Cheshire for each week from November 1861 through the first week 
of December 1862, when the number of paupers reached its highest point5. The increase in the 
number of relief recipients during the cotton famine took place in three phases. From the first 
week in November 1861 to the third week in February 1862, the number of relief recipients 
increased by 78%, from 47,039 to 83,559. The average increase per week was slightly more than 
2400. From the third week in February to the last week in June 1862, the number of paupers 
increased by only 16,600, or 924 per week. The number of relief recipients began to increase 
sharply in late July. From the third week in July through the first week in October, the number of 
paupers increased by 5961 per week, while from the first week in October through the third week 
in November the number of relief recipients increased by 12,057 per week. Overall, from mid-
July to early December the number of paupers increased by 161,738. The feet that the number of 
persons receiving poor relief began to increase rapidly in July 1862 indicates that Kiesling's 
(1996, p. 78) conclusion that "the large increase . . . [in the number of paupers] does not happen 
until January 1863" is misleading, a result of her use of semiannual data. 
 
 
In order to determine the role played by poor relief during the cotton famine, we need to 
compare movements in numbers on relief with movements in unemployment or cotton 
production. No unemployment series exist, but The Economist reported weekly estimates of the 
year-to-date consumption of raw cotton, from which I constructed estimates of cotton 
consumption for each week from September 1861 to December 1862. The resulting series, 
presented in the Appendix, sometimes fluctuates sharply from week to week, but when averaged 
                                               
5 Data on the number of relief recipients in 24 poor law unions and townships were obtained from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 
(1863, LII, pp. 182-192). I excluded Liverpool because it contained very few cotton workers and because the number of relief 
recipients there was determined largely by conditions at the port. For example, the sharp increase in relief recipients in February and 
March 1862 was "entirely due to . . . the prevalence of easterly winds, which stopped the principal business of the port." 
 
 
over several weeks the data probably are a reasonable measure of the trend in cotton production 
during the famine6. 
Figure 1 reports for each week from November 1861 to December 1862 the average 
consumption of raw cotton over the previous 8 weeks. Cotton consumption fell sharply during the 
last 2 months of 1861, from slightly more than 40,000 to about 20,000 bales per week. In 
February 1862 it rebounded to above 25,000 bales per week and then fluctuated between 25,000 
and 30,000 bales until mid-June, when it briefly increased to nearly 35,000 bales per week. In 
early July cotton consumption began to decline very rapidly, felling below 20,000 bales per week 
in mid-August and below 10,000 bales per week in early October. 
 
 
Table 1 compares average weekly cotton consumption for various periods during the 
cotton famine with consumption during the first 6 months of 1861, before the famine began. 
Consumption began to decline in October 1861, then plummeted to 38% of its prefamine level in 
the last 6 weeks of the year. It rebounded in the first half of 1862 to an average of nearly 30,000 
bales per week, two-thirds of its prefamine level. However, cotton consumption fell sharply in the 
summer of 1862; from July 4 to August 28 average weekly consumption was only 60% of its 
level during the previous 6 months. In September consumption declined even further, to its lowest 
point during the famine. From August 29 to October 16 average weekly consumption was a mere 
6857 bales, less than average daily consumption during the previous boom. Consumption 
increased slightly in late October and November, but remained less than a third of its prefamine 
level. 
 A comparison of the trends of cotton consumption and numbers on relief suggests that the 
lag between becoming unemployed and applying for poor relief was relatively short. The sharp 
fall in cotton consumption during the final 6 weeks of 1861 was followed by a rapid increase in 
the number of relief recipients in January and early February 1862. The rebound in cotton 
consumption in the first half of 1862 caused the rate of increase in relief recipients to slow to a 
trickle from March to June. The drop in cotton consumption in July and August led to a rapid 
increase in the number of relief recipients beginning in late July. Finally, the collapse in cotton 
                                               
6 Kiesling (1996, p. 76) maintains that the trend in raw cotton consumption "generally approximates the trend of the distress in 
Lancashire." 
 
 
consumption from September through mid-October was followed by a sharp acceleration in the 
rate of increase in relief recipients beginning in early October. In sum, the three periods when 
cotton consumption dropped sharply (November-December 1861, July-August 1862, September-
October 1862) were followed by rapid increases in the number of relief recipients beginning 
roughly 6, 4, and 4 weeks later. In each case, the rapid increase in numbers on relief lasted about 
7-8 weeks, with half of the total increase occurring within 4 weeks. Assuming that many firms 
initially responded to a decline in production by reducing hours rather than laying off workers, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the average length of time between becoming unemployed and 
applying for relief was around 4-8 weeks. I will argue in Section II that such a lag is consistent 
with available evidence on subsistence levels and the extent of individual saving. 
 Kiesling's conclusion that the poor law was "an institution of last resort" is based on her 
finding that there was a lag of up to 14 months between the beginning of the cotton famine and 
the peak in the number of relief recipients. But her calculation tells us little about the role of poor 
relief, because the cotton famine got much worse over time. In the first half of 1862, weekly 
cotton consumption averaged 67% of its prefamine level; during the second half of 1862 it 
averaged only 25% of its prefamine level. The rapid increase in the number of relief recipients in 
the second half of 1862 was a result of the sharp decline in 
cotton consumption that occurred at the same time. It is not evidence that the poor law was an 
institution of last resort. In fact, the data presented here indicate that the lag between becoming 
unemployed and receiving poor relief was relatively short, which suggests that the poor law 
played an important role in the relief of unemployed operatives during the cotton famine. 
 The data on the number of relief recipients in Fig. 1 are for 23 "distressed" poor law 
unions and townships in Lancashire and Cheshire, while Kiesling focuses on only 6 of these 
unions: Ashton-under-Lyne, Bolton, Oldham, Preston, Rochdale, and Wigan. If the cotton famine 
affected individual poor law unions differently, then Kiesling's conclusions regarding the role of 
poor relief might be determined in part by her choice of unions. Table 2 shows the percentage of 
the population receiving poor relief at five points of time for the 13 largest distressed unions7. 
The rate of increase in the share of relief recipients during the early months of the cotton famine 
differed sharply across unions. From September 1861 to February 1862, the percentage of the 
population receiving poor relief more than tripled in Blackburn, Preston, and Stockport, increased 
by 160% in Ashton-under- Lyne, but rose by only 47% in Chorlton, by 37% in Bolton, and by 
16% in Wigan. The increase in the number of paupers slowed significantly during the spring of 
1862. Still, Table 2 shows that in Ashton numbers on relief were 5 times greater in June 1862 
than in September 1861, 4 times greater in Blackburn and Stockport, and 3.75 times greater in 
Preston. In all unions except Wigan the number of paupers increased sharply during the summer 
and fall of 1862. 
 The large differences across unions in the rate of increase in numbers on poor relief 
during the early months of the famine were caused by differences "in their dependence on the 
cotton industry [and] on the supply of American cotton," and in the types of cotton cloth 
produced (Farnie, 1979, p. 158; Purdy, 1862, p. 377). In Ashton-under-Lyne, Blackburn, Preston, 
and Stockport, where numbers on relief increased sharply, the ratio of adults employed in the 
cotton industry to population was high, in 1861 ranging from 18% in Preston to 22% in 
Blackburn8. On the other hand, in Wigan, where numbers on relief increased very slowly before 
the fall of 1862, employment in the cotton industry was relatively low. In 
                                               
7 Data on the number of relief recipients from November 1861 to December 1862 are from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1863, 
LII, pp. 182-192). Data for August 1861 to October 1861 are from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1862, XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 122-
177). 
8 Data on the number of "persons aged 20 and upwards engaged in cotton manufacture in 1861" are from Great Britain, Parliamentary 
Papers (1863, LII, pp. 196-219). Data on the adult population of poor law unions are not available. The percentages reported in the 
text and in the first column of Table 2 were calculated as the number of adults employed in the cotton industry divided by the 
 
 
Bolton, another union in which numbers on relief increased slowly, "the local economy was 
superbly balanced and diversified.... As a centre of medium-fine spinning Bolton consumed far 
less cotton than Blackburn and did not depend so much upon American cotton" (Farnie, 1979, p. 
161). 
 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of the trends in the share of the population on relief for 
three sets of poor law unions: the six unions used by Kiesling; Ashton-under-Lyne, Blackburn, 
and Preston (ABP), the three unions most affected by the famine; and Bolton and Wigan (BW), 
two unions largely unaffected by the famine before the fall of 1862. In August and September 
1861 the share receiving relief was roughly similar for the three series, but their trends began to 
diverge soon thereafter. In ABP, the share on relief increased to 7.0% in February 1862, to 9.1% 
in June, and to 15% in September. The share on relief grew at a much slower rate in Kiesling's six 
unions, reaching 4.5% in February 1862, 5.5%) in June, and 9.4% in September. The differences 
in trends between the ABP and the BW series are striking. In Bolton and Wigan the share on 
relief increased from 2.6% in September 1861 to 3.6% in June 1862 and 4.3% in September. In 
September 1861 the share of the population receiving relief was slightly higher in BW than in 
ABP; by September 1862 the share on relief was more than three times larger in ABP than in 
BW. 
Kiesling's conclusion that the poor law was an institution of last resort is based on her 
finding that, in the six poor law unions she analyzes, numbers on relief did not begin to increase 
rapidly until the fall of 1862, while the cotton famine began in the fall of 1861. However, her data 
do not offer a proper measure of the role of poor relief during the early months of the famine, 
because only two of her six unions, Ashton-under-Lyne and Preston, were strongly affected by 
the shortage of American cotton during the winter of 1861-1862, and two other unions, Bolton 
and Wigan, were among those least affected by the famine. In Ashton, Blackburn, Preston, and 
                                                                                                                                            
population of the poor law union in 1861. While they understate the share of the adult population employed in cotton manufacturing, 
the percentages reported enable one to compare the importance of the cotton industry across poor law unions. 
 
 
Stockport, the four unions most affected by the shortage of American cotton during the early 
months of the famine, the number of relief recipients more than tripled from September 1861 to 
February 1862 and more than quadrupled from September 1861 to June 1862. The number of 
able-bodied relief recipients in these four unions rose from 4321 in the first week of July 1861 to 
32,233 in the first week of July 1862, an increase of 645%9. This rapid increase in numbers on 
relief is evidence of the important role played by the poor law in these unions in the winter and 
spring of 1862. 
 
The fact that the number of able-bodied and non-able-bodied relief recipients peaked at 
the same time does indeed suggest, as Kiesling argues, that many non-able-bodied persons were 
assisted by informal methods during the early part of the cotton famine. However, one should be 
careful in interpreting this result. For one thing, we do not know what share of non-able-bodied 
working-class individuals were in receipt of poor relief either before or during the cotton famine. 
The number of non-able-bodied relief recipients roughly doubled between January 1861 and 
January 1863. It is conceivable that one-third or more of non-ablebodied working-class 
individuals received poor relief in January 1861, which would indicate both that many non-able-
bodied individuals were assisted by informal methods and that the poor law was an important 
source of income for the non-able-bodied before the cotton famine. Such a conclusion is 
supported by the work of Thomson (1986, p. 370), who contends that during much of the 
nineteenth century working-class individuals "could look with a near-certain expectation of 
regular and prolonged assistance in old age" from the poor law. 
                                               
9 For the same period, the number of able-bodied relief recipients in Bolton and Wigan increased by 75%. From the first week of July 
1861 to the first week of January 1862, the number of able-bodied relief recipients increased by 166% in the four unions most affected 
by the shortage of American cotton and by 30% in Bolton and Wigan. Data on the number of able-bodied relief recipients are from 
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1861, LIU, pp. 167, 169,229,231; 1862, XLVIII, pp. 167, 169). It will be recalled that these data 
are available for only 2 weeks a year—the first week in January and the first week in July 
 
 
The fact that many cotton operatives supported their aged relatives is not evidence that, 
when unemployed, they viewed the poor law as an institution of last resort. Coresident aged 
relatives performed services, such as child-minding and housekeeping, and they often enabled 
young mothers to work in the cotton factories. In this way, "parents who were supported . . . 
[made] reciprocal contribution[s] to the family's finances" (Anderson, 1971, pp. 141-144). 
Finally, not all of the able-bodied cotton operatives who supported their infirm relatives 
did so by choice. The poor law made "explicit the expectation that individuals would support 
close relatives, and it was important in extreme cases in enforcing the obligation" (Dupree, 1995, 
pp. 309-310). Boards of Guardians might have put pressure on cotton operatives to support their 
aged parents. Of course, when unemployed operatives applied for poor relief, the aged relatives 
they were assisting also would be forced to apply for relief. 
 
Section II. 
 
Kiesling (1996, p. 69) maintains that cotton operatives were paid "some of the highest 
wages in the industrial occupations," which enabled them "to save and accumulate assets." She 
does not, however, present any evidence regarding the size of the average operative's savings in 
1861. In this section I examine the role of individual saving as a method of income assistance 
during downturns and offer evidence suggesting that the average cotton worker's savings could 
not have been large enough to enable him when unemployed to subsist for more than 6-8 weeks. 
Wood (1910) reports extensive wage data for cotton operatives during this period. In 
1859-1861, just before the cotton famine began, the average wage of spinners was 24s.4d. per 
week, while that of power loom weavers was 12s.6d. per week10. Women and children were 
employed as winders, reelers, piecers, and helpers and were paid 5-10s. per week (Wood, 1910, 
pp. 28-29,42). The average weekly wage for all cotton factory operatives in 1860 was 
lls.7d.(Wood, 1910, p. 128)11. However, 1860 was a boom year and wages were exceptionally 
high. During the decade 1851-1860 the average wage was 10.3s. per week. By comparison, 
during the decade preceding the 1847-1848 downtown the average wage was 9.5s. per week 
(Wood, 1910, pp. 127-128). The average real wage of cotton factory workers increased by 11.0% 
from 1837-1846 to 1851-186012. This suggests that the savings of the average cotton worker in 
1861 was only slightly larger than that of the average cotton worker in 1847 and therefore that the 
lag between becoming unemployed and applying for poor relief should have been similar for the 
two downturns. 
 The ability to save varied greatly across cotton operatives' households, being determined 
by the household head's wage, family size, and the number of household members working. A 
household consisting of a class 1 spinner (earning 39.5s. per week in 1859-1861), a wife 
employed as a winder or reeler, and two teenage boys employed as piecers would have had a 
weekly income of about £3 in 1860. But the number of class 1 spinners was relatively small, and 
few households could have had weekly incomes as high as £3. A household consisting of a class 
3 spinner, a wife employed as a winder, and no employed children would have had a weekly 
income of about 30s. Finally, a household consisting of a power-loom weaver, an employed wife, 
and one employed child would have had a weekly income of perhaps 27s.; if the wife did not 
work, weekly income would have been less than £1. 
 Anderson (1971, p. 128) estimated that the cost of subsistence for a husband and wife in 
mid-nineteenth century Lancashire was 9s.8d.10s.2d. per week and that the additional cost of a 
child was 2s.l0d. Thus, the cost of subsistence for a family with two children was 15s. 10d.; for a 
                                               
10 Class 1 spinners earned 39s.6d. per week, class 2 spinners earned 22s.6d., and class 3 spinners earned 2 ls.6d. on average (Wood, 
1910, p. 28). The fact that the average wage for all spinners was 24s.4d. indicates that the percentage of class 1 spinners was small. 
11 The wage reported is the average for men, women, and children combined. Wood does not report the average wage for adult males. 
12 Cost of living estimates for 1837-1846 and 1851-1860 are from Williamson (1985, pp. 216, 220). 
 
 
family with four children it was 21s.6d. Other studies suggest that Anderson's estimates of the 
cost of subsistence are somewhat low. Barnsby's (1971, pp. 228-229) detailed analysis of 
workers' expenditures in the Black Country indicated that the "minimum necessary expenditure" 
for a family with two small children was 15s.6d.-18s. per week in 1850 and perhaps 2s. higher in 
1860, while Dupree (1995, p. 358) estimated that in the Potteries in 1861 the cost of subsistence 
for a family with two children was 17s.2d. per week13. 
 During prosperous times the consumption of most well-paid cotton operatives was well 
above the subsistence level. Arnold (1865, pp. 75-76) wrote that cotton operatives were 
"accustomed to live well." He went on to say that 
 
while they are not wasteful, they are not saving. Of food they have the best, 
which they consume in quantities far larger than the requirements of healthy life 
demand. Teetotalism is not common among them, and not a few are large 
consumers of ardent spirits. (Arnold, 1865, p. 106) 
 
Similarly, Drs. George Buchanan and Edward Smith, who studied the health of cotton workers 
during the famine, observed that they "spent liberally on food" during normal times (Oddy, 1983, 
p. 77). Buchanan noted that well-paid operatives did not see "the advantages of a careful domestic 
economy, and now in hard times they have no knowledge how to make the most of their scanty 
incomes" (quoted in Henderson, 1934, p. 101). 
 A household with a weekly income of £3, even if it was "accustomed to live well," would 
have been able to save a few shillings a week. On the other hand, the ability to save of a 
household with a weekly income of 30s. or less depended on family size and consumption 
patterns. Anderson (1971, p. 32) concluded that "few even in good times could afford to save 
anything very significant to meet temporary losses in income . . . so that even short or 
comparatively minor crises caused severe destitution." As evidence of working-class savings, 
Kiesling cites Watts's (1866, p. 339) estimate that in 1861-1864 there was an excess of 
withdrawals over deposits of £550,000 from savings banks in the cotton districts. Watts 
maintained, however, that 
 
only a small portion of the deposits in those institutions belongs to the operatives, 
properly so called; the bulk represents in a much larger degree the savings of 
domestic servants, of the children of small tradesmen, and of the lower stratum of 
the middle class generally. (Watts, 1866, p. 338) 
 
No evidence exists on the extent of cotton households' savings in 1860, but we can get a 
rough idea of its magnitude by examining evidence on working-class savings circa 1900 collected 
by Johnson (1985). In 1899, 83% of accounts in Post Office Savings Banks had a balance of 
under £25; the average balance in these accounts was £4, and the median balance was even 
smaller. The average balance of accounts under £50 was £6 in 1894. As late as 1929, 72% of 
accounts had balances of less than £20, with an average balance of £3.4 (Johnson, 1985, pp. 100-
102). Johnson (1985, p. 103) considered £50 to be "an upper limit for most working-class savings 
bank deposits" in 1911-1913. Even if all balances below £50 in 1894 or 1899 were held by 
working-class households, which is unlikely, the median working-class balance could not have 
been greater than £5. Real wages for manual workers were 85% higher in 1901 than in 1861 
(Feinstein, 1995, p. 31). The median savings account balance held by cotton operatives in 1860 
                                               
13 Bamsby (1971, pp. 228-229) estimated that the "minimum necessary expenditure per week" for a family of four in 1850 was 
25s.2'/4d., but he includes expenditures on services, savings, newspapers, etc. The cost of food, housing, fuel, household necessities, 
shoes and clothing, and household durables totaled 15s.63/4d. per week. Barnsby described the food allotment in his budget as "very 
spartan." Adding expenditures on drink and tobacco brings the total to 18s.2'/2d. 
 
 
therefore was almost certainly less than £3, and a significant share of operatives must have had no 
money at all in savings banks. 
 Given the cost of subsistence noted above, an unemployed cotton worker with a wife and 
two small children could subsist for about 4 weeks on £3 savings, while a cotton worker with four 
children could subsist for about 3 weeks on £314. If unemployed workers and their families 
moved in with kin in order to save money on rent and fuel, they could subsist for a few more 
weeks on their savings15. On the other hand, cotton operatives who spent several weeks on short 
time used up some of their savings before being laid off and therefore when unemployed were 
able to subsist for fewer weeks (Boot, 1990, p. 226). 
 Kiesling and others maintain that, once their savings were exhausted, many unemployed 
operatives pawned furniture, clothing, bedding, and other items in order to avoid applying for 
relief16.  I have not been able to find any estimates of how much money the typical cotton 
operative in 1862 could have obtained from pawning such items. Johnson (1985, p. 167) 
concludes that "most goods pawned . . . were of low value." It seems unlikely that a family of 
four or larger could have subsisted for more than a few weeks on the money obtained from 
pawning their goods. Moreover, it is not clear what share of unemployed operatives resorted to 
pawning before applying for poor relief. 
 By draining their savings accounts, pawning household items, and moving in with kin, 
unemployed cotton operatives were able to subsist for several weeks without public assistance. 
The length of time that a household could subsist depended on the amount of its savings, a 
function of income and consumption patterns, and its subsistence costs, a function of family size. 
From the evidence presented here, I would estimate that a typical unemployed operative could 
subsist for 4—8 weeks. Some highly paid spinners with relatively large savings account balances 
could have subsisted for much longer, while lower-paid operatives with no money in savings 
accounts and large families could have subsisted for only a few weeks. On the whole, the 
evidence on the role of individual saving is consistent with the estimates of the lag between 
becoming unemployed and applying for relief presented in Section I. 
 
     Section III. 
 
What role did the poor law play in the relief of unemployed cotton operatives? Kiesling 
contends that unemployed operatives lived off their savings for as long as possible, then pawned 
household items and moved in with kin. When these informal sources of income became 
inadequate, they turned to private charity. Unemployed workers did not apply for poor relief until 
they had exhausted all other alternatives, and the availability of private charity kept some 
operatives "off of public relief entirely" (Kiesling, 1996, p. 76). Workers turned first to informal 
assistance because they were "horrified at the thought of being branded a pauper by accepting 
public relief; they applied for poor relief "only once private charity diminished" because they 
attached less stigma to receiving charity than poor relief (Kiesling, 1996, pp. 71, 79). 
The statement that workers were afraid of "being branded a pauper" implies that 
unemployed operatives who applied for poor relief during downturns were classified as ordinary 
paupers. This typically was not the case. Public opinion considered downturns in trade "to be 
outside the control of the workmen" (Dupree, 1995, p. 321). Partly in response to this view, 
                                               
14 The cost of subsistence was higher for a worker supporting one or two aged parents, and therefore the length of time he and his 
family could subsist on a given level of savings was smaller. 
15 Anderson (1971, p. 201) estimates that the minimum weekly expenditure on food for a family of four was 10s.6d. in 1851. Thus an 
unemployed worker with a wife and two children who moved in with kin and spent money only on food could subsist for about 6 
weeks on £3 savings. 
16 See Kiesling (1996, p. 72), Henderson (1934, p. 98), and Anderson (1971, p. 150). For a discussion of the importance of pawn 
broking for working-class households in Victorian Britain, see Johnson (1985, pp. 165-188). 
 
 
Boards of Guardians differentiated between cyclically unemployed operatives and "confirmed 
paupers"; they argued that "it was degrading for those unemployed through no fault of their own 
to be set to work with idle and dissolute paupers" (Rose, 1970, p. 133; Edsall, 1971, pp. 248-249). 
The contention that operatives attached less stigma to receiving private charity than to poor relief, 
while accepted by some contemporaries and historians, is rejected by others. According to Arnold 
(1865, p. 99), "as a rule, the operatives greatly preferred to be pensioners of the [charity] 
committees rather than of the guardians." However, MacKay, who strongly supported the use of 
voluntary action to meet "extraordinary crises," concluded that 
 
the arguments, therefore, that the labourer preferred charity to the Poor Law . . . 
is largely contrary to fact.. . if there is a preference, it is rather the other way, 
namely, for a subvention from the rates to which he himself contributes, and to 
which... he may be persuaded that he has a right. (MacKay, 1899, p. 419) 
 
Kiesling's contention that the sources of income for unemployed operatives passed 
through distinct stages, from informal assistance to private charity to poor relief, is not supported 
by the available evidence. Large numbers of unemployed workers received poor relief and private 
charity at the same time. The Manchester and Salford District Provident Society "made it their 
rule to assist only those who Were accepted as proper recipients by the Poor Law," and the 
majority of persons receiving poor relief in Preston and Oldham in the fell of 1862 also received 
assistance from local charity (MacKay, 1899, p. 413; Arnold, 1865, pp. 136, 144-145)17. MacKay 
(1899, p. 413) concluded that "over a considerable part of the [distressed area] . . . charitable 
funds were used to supplement the Poor Law Allowance. 
 There is no evidence that the majority of unemployed workers turned to poor relief "only 
once private charity diminished." The number of poor relief recipients began to increase rapidly 
in July 1862 and peaked in December 186218. According to Kiesling (1996, p. 76), "private 
charity increased dramatically during 1862, then fell off over the course of 1863." Thus, the 
increase in poor relief recipients was not preceded by a sharp decline in private charity. 
Henderson (1934, p. 68) suggests that the increase in private charity was largely a response to the 
inadequacy of poor relief: "the Poor Law was unable to stand the exceptional strain put upon it by 
the Cotton Famine.... The help which the operatives so urgently needed, had, therefore, to come 
from private charity."  
 Poor law guardians and charity officials agreed that the minimum amount of income 
necessary to maintain unemployed workers and their families in good health was about 2s. per 
person per week (Watts, 1866, pp. 199-200; Henderson, 1934, pp. 99-100; Rose, 1977, p. 191). 
Data reported by Kiesling (1996, p. 83) indicate that during the height of the cotton famine poor 
relief expenditures averaged less than ls.6d. per person per week. Local Boards of Guardians 
realized that the relief they were granting was inadequate and "assumed that this meagre sum 
would be augmented from other sources, short-time earnings, income from other members of the 
femily or charitable aid" (Rose, 1977, p. 189)19. Their assumption appears to have been correct. 
According to Arnold (1865, p. 191), "a large number" of the 248,000 persons receiving outdoor 
relief in the last week of December 1862 "were receiving supplementary aid from the relief 
committees." Many of those receiving poor relief must also have been getting informal assistance 
from family members or neighbors. Dupree (1995, p. 315) concluded from her analysis of the role 
of family assistance in the Potteries during this period that poor relief was not "a mutually 
                                               
17 On the other hand, in Rochdale and Stockport private charity was only offered to persons "who received no help from the 
guardians" (Arnold, 1865, pp. 145-146). 
18 See above, Fig. 1 and Table 2. 
19 The chairman of the Ashton Board of Guardians commented in the spring of 1863 that "surely no one expected that what the 
guardians gave was enough of itself" (quoted in Rose, 1977, p. 189). 
 
 
exclusive alternative to family relationships as a source of assistance.  Instead, resort to assistance 
from family members and from out-relief were closely related and they could exist 
simultaneously." 
 Weekly poor relief payments to unemployed operatives and their families were somewhat 
smaller during the cotton famine than during previous downturns, when grants averaged between 
ls.6d. and 2s. per person per week (Rose, 1965, pp. 195-196). The administrators of charitable 
funds, anxious that their funds should "relieve the destitute and not the ratepayers," argued that 
poor relief expenditures should be raised to 2s. per head per week. The Guardians replied that 
such an increase would require an "oppressive increase in the rates" (Arnold, 1865, pp. 150-152). 
The poor rates were assessed largely on property that depended on the cotton trade, so that the 
same factors that increased the demand for poor relief also reduced the effective tax base of the 
distressed areas. Relief payments therefore were relatively small during the famine because 
Boards of Guardians either would not or could not raise taxes by enough to maintain the 
exceptionally large number of applicants at the usual level of generosity20. 
 Most contemporaries agreed that the demand for poor relief during the cotton famine was 
unprecedented. Arnold (1865, p. 208) wrote that "the incidence of the poor-rate was never so 
oppressive over an equal extent of the kingdom as in the cotton districts during the months which 
included the crisis of the famine," and MacKay (1899, p. 388) concluded that the cotton famine 
was "the most serious crisis with which the English Poor Law has ever been called on to grapple." 
The poor law was unable to meet this unprecedented demand, and so private charity played a 
larger role during the famine than it did in any previous downturn. As a result, an analysis of the 
sources of income assistance to unemployed operatives that focuses on the cotton famine will 
significantly overestimate the importance of private charity, and underestimate the importance of 
poor relief, during the period 1830-187021. 
 
     Section IV. 
 
In my earlier work on the role of poor relief in industrial cities, I stated that in many cities 
workers on short time were eligible for poor relief, and that as a result employers initially 
responded to downturns by reducing hours per worker, and only began to lay off workers when 
the state of the economy became "sufficiently bad" (Boyer, 1990, pp. 240-241). In fact, for many 
employers the use of worksharing was part of a cost-minimizing strategy even if workers on short 
time were not eligible for relief. Risk averse workers preferred worksharing to random layoffs. So 
long as employers were not made worse off by worksharing, they should have agreed to reduce 
hours during minor downturns. However, most firms faced a minimum hours constraint, so that 
when economic conditions got sufficiently bad employers resorted to layoffs22. 
 This theory appears to accurately depict the response of employers in the textile-
producing districts to fluctuations in demand. Kiesling (1996, p. 70) and Arnold (1865, pp. 57-58, 
68-69) provide evidence that short time preceded layoffs during the cotton famine. Similarly, 
Boot (1990, pp. 220-221) found that short time preceded layoffs in Manchester during the 1847-
1848 depression, and Huberman (1986, p. 992; 1987, pp. 189-190) maintained that, in the 1830s 
and 1840s, urban Lancashire cotton firms worked short time during minor downturns, and turned 
to layoffs during prolonged slumps. 
 While short time was an important part of implicit labor contracts throughout the period, 
during the cotton famine the relationship between worksharing and poor relief was significantly 
                                               
20 This conclusion is supported by the work of Stephen Easton (1978, pp. 327-329), who found a significant negative relationship 
between the number of outdoor relief recipients and the generosity of relief benefits in England and Wales from 1857 to 1910. 
21 The Crusade against Outrelief led to a radical change in English poor law policy after 1870. See MacKinnon (1987). 
22 For an analysis of the role of worksharing in implicit contracts models, see Rosen (1985, pp. 1162-1165) and Burdett and Wright 
(1989). 
 
 
different than in earlier decades. Kiesling (1996, pp. 73, 70) states that workers on short time 
"could not receive public relief to supplement their wages," and therefore worksharing "obviated 
worker movement to public relief." In contrast, during the 1830s and 1840s factory workers on 
short time received poor relief in many Lancashire and West Riding cities. For example, the clerk 
of the Bolton Poor Law Union testified in 1841 that "in consequence of the working of the 
factories half time, the applications from all classes of operatives... for relief on the ground of 
insufficiency of earnings, have been numerous and pressing during the last two years." The 
Bolton Guardians granted applicants enough relief to make up their income "to 2s.3d. per head 
per week for the whole of the family, where we clearly ascertain the amount [the applicant's 
family] earned" (Parliamentary Papers, 1846, XXXVI, pp. 12-13). 
 According to Rose (1965, p. 199), before 1834 "most poor relief authorities [in the 
industrial Northwest] felt quite justified in making small payments to factory workers whose 
hours or wages had been reduced during a period of depression." Boards of Guardians in 
Lancashire and the West Riding continued "this established practice" under the new poor law23. It 
is not possible to determine the extent to which factory workers on short time received poor relief 
during the 1840s. One piece of evidence suggesting that the practice was widespread is the "storm 
of protest" from Boards of Guardians in the industrial Northwest in response to the Outdoor 
Relief Regulation Order of August 1852, which, among other things, forbade the payment of poor 
relief to able-bodied males in employment. The protests caused the Poor Law Board to modify 
the Order in such a way as to make evasion easy (Rose, 1970, pp. 134-135)24. 
 The evidence presented here indicates that during the 1830s and 1840s worksharing was 
not necessarily a substitute for poor relief, as Kiesling contends. Of course, not all factory 
workers on short time applied for or received poor relief. Highly paid operatives probably were 
able to subsist on their wages even if the work week was cut from 6 to 4 days, but many lower-
paid operatives could not have subsisted on two-thirds or, if they had several small children, even 
five-sixths of their usual weekly income. Boot (1990, p. 226) maintains that the reduction in 
earnings associated with short-time work caused many factory operatives "to sell off assets, use 
up savings, or go into debt." Many others turned to the poor law for assistance. 
 Unlike in earlier downturns, during the cotton famine few workers on short time received 
poor relief. Most operatives working 3 or 4 day weeks therefore would have been forced to 
deplete their resources or move in with kin in order to subsist, so that when they eventually 
became unemployed the length of time they could have gone without applying for poor relief 
and/or private charity was quite short. Kiesling's contention that operatives spent extended 
periods working short time and then, when unemployed, subsisted for several months on informal 
sources of income is plausible only for a very small number of highly paid spinners with large 
savings account balances. 
 Finally, it is important to note that workers' preference for worksharing over random 
layoffs does not imply that they attached a stigma to receiving poor relief. A cotton spinner 
working a 4 or 5 day week typically had an income significantly higher than the payment he 
would have received from the guardians if unemployed25.  Moreover, worksharing offered 
employment stability; a worker who was laid off had no guarantee that he would be rehired by the 
same firm when the economy recovered. Thus, even if workers attached no stigma to receiving 
poor relief, they would have preferred worksharing to random layoffs. 
                                               
23 For evidence of the payment of poor relief to factory workers on short time after 1834, see Rose (1966, pp. 614-616). 
24 The amended order prohibited "the giving of relief at the same identical time as that at which the person receiving it is in actual 
employment, and in the receipt of wages." It did not prohibit granting relief to "a man working for wages one day and being without 
work the next, or working half the week and being unemployed during the remainder" (Arnold, 1865, pp. 49-50). 
25 Relief payments to unemployed workers were based on family size. (See Section III.) An unemployed operative with a wife and 
two (four) children typically would have received 7-8s. (10-1 Is.) per week from the guardians. For comparison, in 1859-1861 a class 
3 spinner working a 4 (5)-day week would have earned 14s.5d. (17s.lld); a class 1 spinner would have earned 26s.5d. working a 4-day 
week. 
 
 
     Section V. 
 
My earlier work overstated the similarities between poor relief in early Victorian cities 
and current unemployment insurance systems. However, Kiesling's conclusion that "the poor law 
provided an insurance institution of final recourse" significantly understates the importance of 
poor relief. The evidence presented here indicates that the poor law was a major source of income 
assistance to unemployed cotton operatives during the Lancashire cotton famine and that it played 
an even larger role in assisting unemployed and underemployed workers during the downturns of 
the 1830s and 1840s. 
 Kiesling's main piece of evidence in support of the conclusion that workers viewed poor 
relief as a last resort is her finding that the lag between the beginning of the cotton famine and the 
widespread application for poor relief was as long as 14 months. However, her calculation is 
based on semiannual data on the number of relief recipients, and it does not take into account the 
fact that the cotton famine got much worse over time—raw cotton consumption collapsed in the 
late summer of 1862, not the fall of 1861. My comparison of weekly data on the number of relief 
recipients with estimates of weekly cotton consumption for the period November 1861 to 
December 1862 suggests that the average length of time between becoming unemployed and 
applying for poor relief was about 4-8 weeks. This is similar to Boot's finding of a 6-week lag for 
Manchester cotton workers during the 1847-1848 downturn. It also is consistent with the 
evidence on working-class savings presented in Section II. 
 Unemployed cotton workers faced a variety of "assistance alternatives" during the 
Lancashire cotton famine. Kiesling stresses the role played by informal assistance and private 
charity and maintains that unemployed operatives applied for poor relief only after they had 
exhausted all other sources of income assistance. The evidence presented here does not support 
her scenario. Most cotton workers had very little savings and could not have subsisted for more 
than 6-8 weeks on "informal assistance" even if they had pawned household items and moved in 
with kin. Moreover, while private charity played a larger role during the cotton famine than in 
any previous downturn, there is no evidence that a large share of unemployed operatives applied 
for poor relief "only once private charity diminished." In fact, unemployed workers in many 
Lancashire cities received poor relief and private charity at the same time. 
 Whether or not operatives were averse to receiving poor relief, given the meager amount 
of informal assistance available to them, most were forced to turn to the poor law for assistance 
during downturns in trade. It was for this reason that for three decades after 1834 both workers 
and local relief administrators in Lancashire fought against, and succeeded in blocking, all 
attempts to end the granting of outdoor relief to unemployed workers. 
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